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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC., ; 
d/b/a MARKO ENTERPRISES, a ] 
Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, an ] 
agency of the State of Utah, ] 
Defendant. ] 
> Case No. 870468 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MARK 0. HAROLDSEN, INC. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. This appeal is from the lower court's granting of 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission on stipulated 
facts. The lower court's conclusions of law need be accorded 
no difference by this court. 
2. The undisputed evidence in the record 
demonstrates that the services performed by the mailing list 
brokers were essential to the transaction and that the 
taxpayer's payments were at least as much for the service 
rendered by the brokers as for the lists themselves. 
3. The weight of authority supports the taxpayer's 
position that the taxpayer purchased the right to use 
intangible information rather than tangible personal property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TAXPAYER IS ENTITLED TO A DE NOVO REVIEW ON APPEAL. 
The taxpayer, Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc., was entitled to 
a de novo trial in the district court from the adverse ruling 
of the State Tax Commission. As this Court held in the case of 
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
617 P. 2d 397 (Utah 1980), a de novo review means that the 
tax-payer is entitled to "a new trial in which all questions of 
law and fact are addressed to that court [the district court]. 
Such proceedings are governed by the rules applicable to other 
trials; and appeals may be taken therefrom to this court." 
Id. at 399. In Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (Utah 1981), 
this Court noted that a de novo review which involves a 
complete retrial upon new evidence "affords a party who is 
about to suffer from administrative action a closer judicial 
scrutiny than a mere review of the record of agency action, and 
we think this preferable in view of the seriousness of the 
administrative action and the relative ease with which the 
limited factual issue can be subjected to retrial in the 
district court." Id. at 417. 
The de novo review performed by the district court in 
the present case was a complete retrial. The district court 
could have received new evidence and heard testimony. As it 
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was, the parties stipulated to the facts and the case was 
disposed by motion for summary judgment. Under Sacramento 
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Company, 748 
P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987), this Court can review the 
stipulated facts as easily as the district court did, and the 
district court's conclusions of law from the stipulated facts 
should be afforded no deference. 
II. 
IT IS UNDISPUTED, BASED ON THE STIPULATED FACTS, 
THAT THE USE OF THE MAGNETIC TAPES AND PRINTED LISTS 
WAS INCIDENTAL TO A SALE OF INTANGIBLE SERVICES. 
The Tax Commission urges this Court to consider four 
factors in determining whether the dominant purpose of the 
transaction was the purchase of services: (1) whether the 
service involved was consequential or inconsequential to the 
conveyance of the tangible personal property; (2) whether there 
was a separate charge for the service in addition to the charge 
for the products; (3) whether the purchase or renter acquired a 
tangible personal property interest; and (4) whether the value 
of the product was temporary or transitory. Respondent's 
Brief, at 6. Even under this test urged by the Tax Commission, 
the purchase of a service performed by the mailing list broker 
was a central purpose of the transactions in question. 
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1. The service involved was consequential to the 
conveyance of the magnetic tapes and printed lists. The 
record, which was stipulated to, demonstrated without dispute 
that the taxpayer was purchasing a service. Thomas Tolman 
testified that "the actual money, from our point of view, to 
the broker, is far more for the broker's services and what he 
is able to give us than it is for the actual tape and paper.'1 
(Tr. 54). Without the assistance of the broker's expertise in 
selecting and refining the mailing lists, the taxpayer would be 
left with a "raw" list which would have little value to the 
company, if any. (Tr. 32, 94). The taxpayer relied on the 
list broker in selecting the lists and preparing them for usage 
by the taxpayer. (Tr. 29, 43). The service, under the 
stipulated facts, was a consequential part of the transaction. 
There was no other evidence, other than that presented by the 
taxpayer, regarding the importance of the broker's services. 
The Tax Commission attempts to minimize the importance of the 
service rendered by the broker, but does so without any support 
from the record. 
2. There was a separate charge for the service in 
addition to the charge for the magnetic tapes. The record 
indicates that after the magnetic tape was used once, it was to 
be returned, erased, or destroyed. In situations where the 
tape could be kept, a separate fee was charged for the tape, 
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from $15 to $25. (Tr. 11-14, 44, 46-47). The balance of the 
fee charged to the taxpayer was for the information contained 
on the tape and for the service rendered by the broker in 
tailoring the mailing list information in a way that would be 
useful to the taxpayer. 
3. The taxpayer did not acquire a tangible personal 
property interest in the information on the magnetic tape. 
The taxpayer was entitled only to a one-time use of the 
information contained on a magnetic tape. Once the magnetic 
tape was used to input the mailing list information into the 
computer, the taxpayer was prohibited from utilizing the tape 
again for the same purpose. The taxpayer would continue to 
have a tangible personal property interest in the tape itself 
and could use the tape for other purposes. The taxpayer could 
not, however, use the tape to generate a mailing list. (Tr. 
11-14, 44, 46-47). 
4. The value of the tapes was temporary and 
transitory. As mentioned above, once the magnetic tape has 
been used it may not be used again to generate a mailing list. 
The value of the product was clearly temporary and transitory. 
The essence of the transaction between the taxpayer 
and the owners of the mailing lists was the purchase of mailing 
list information that had been carefully prepared and refined 
by a mailing list broker. The magnetic tapes used by the 
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taxpayer in this case are different from the piece of cake to 
which the Tax Commission analogized in its brief. In the 
Commission's analogy, the purchase of the cake for the purpose 
of consumption is the real object of the agreement between the 
purchaser and the baker. It is the cake itself that the 
purchaser desires, which can be touched, tasted, smelled, and 
eaten. Plainly, the baker's services in creating the cake were 
only of value to the extent that they enhanced the quality of 
the appearance and the taste of the cake. The services 
performed by the mailing list brokers are different from those 
performed by a baker. The mailing list brokers utilize their 
expertise and knowledge to refine a raw mailing list so as to 
make it useful for the taxpayer's purposes. The refined list 
is not tangible, but may be contained or communicated through a 
number of different media. In the present case, the lists were 
transferred through magnetic tapes and printed labels. The 
taxpayer is interested only in the information contained on the 
tape and printed lists. Once the information is removed from 
the tape and placed in a computer, the tape ceases to have 
value, demonstrating that it was not the tape itself that was 
the real object of the transaction but the information 
contained thereon. 
The lists in this case are also different from the 
multiple listing book that was at issue in Old West Realty, 
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Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 110 Idaho 546, 716 P.2d 
1318 (1986), the dress pattern to which the court analogized in 
the case of Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust 
Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983), and the toy design 
package considered in Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 
A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985), cited by the Tax Commission in its brief, 
at 5-7. Each of these items could be touched and handled and 
were clearly tangible. The useful nature of a piece of cake or 
a dress pattern can never be separated from the tangible 
physical properties of the item. The information on the 
magnetic tape, however, consists of millions of magnetic 
impulses by which the information is coded on the tape. Those 
impulses constitute the real value of the transaction. Once 
the information is removed from the tape and placed into the 
computer, the tape is virtually worthless, even though it still 
exists in the same form. It has not been eaten as a piece of 
cake or cut up to make a dress. 
The Tax Commission in its brief argues that the 
mailing lists prepared by the list brokers are not customized 
but are merely "canned" lists, the form of which has been 
"merely rearranged" by the broker. Respondent's Brief at 9. 
The record, however, was to the contrary. According to the 
record the lists were certainly customized and tailored to the 
individual needs of the taxpayer. (Tr. 32, 41, 52-57, 62, 
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94-95). Although the Tax Commission may like to think of the 
mailing lists as "canned," when it stipulated to the facts in 
the case below, it agreed to accept all of the facts in the 
record as true. According to the record, the lists were 
clearly customized. There was no evidence to the contrary. 
III. 
THE TAXPAYER PURCHASED AND USED INTANGIBLE INFORMATION. 
The Tax Commission cites no case in which the purchase 
or use of mailing lists was held to be taxable. It ignores the 
cases cited by the taxpayer that hold that mailing lists 
transferred by magnetic tape are not tangible personal 
property, Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179, 440 A.2d 104 (1981); Fingerhut 
Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 257 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 
1977); and Mertz v. State Tax Commission, 89 A.D.2d 396, 456 
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1982). 
The Tax Commission attempts to classify the 
tailor-made magnetic tapes in this case with books, videos, 
cassettes, and records generally purchased by the public. As 
argued in the taxpayer's initial Brief, these items are clearly 
distinguishable and have been so recognized by the majority of 
cases that have considered the issue. Books, videos, cassettes 
and records can each be used multiples of times. The value of 
the item is inseparable from the item itself. The items, once 
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used, are capable of being used again--whether or not the owner 
chooses to use them. The value lies in the tangible item 
itself. The magnetic tape, however, is different. The 
information is removed and placed in the computer, leaving the 
tape essentially worthless. The tape may thereafter be 
destroyed or erased. The separate charge for the tape was 
minimal. 
The Tax Commission cites several cases that hold that 
the use of customized computer software is taxable as tangible 
personal property. These cases represent a minority view and 
demonstrate the difficulty that arises when courts attempt to 
bend notions of tangibility to encompass computer-age transfers 
of information. Rather than trying to force the present 
statute to accomodate a situation for which it was never 
intended, this Court should defer to the legislature, which 
certainly has the power to direct by appropriate legislation 
that the sale or use of information be taxed, as has been done 
in the State of New York. See Skaggs-Walsh, Inc. v. State 
Tax Commission, 120 A.D. 2d 786, 501 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1986). 
Finally, the taxpayer concedes that there is, in fact, 
a distinction between information coded on magnetic computer 
tape and the printed labels that are purchased. If this Court 
concludes that the money paid by the taxpayer was not for 
services, and if the Court further determines that the purchase 
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of the labels ought to be taxed, the taxpayer urges the Court 
not to tax the use of the magnetic tapes. The preprinted 
labels purchased by the taxpayer were conceptually and 
physically different from the magnetic tapes and were used in 
an entirely different fashion. The labels were applied 
directly to the envelopes and placed in the mail. The magnetic 
tape, however, was used only to transfer the information into a 
computer, following which the tapes could not be used. 
Although the taxpayer contends that neither the use of the tape 
or of the labels should be taxed, it recognizes that a 
distinction does exist between the labels and the tapes that 
might justify a different tax treatment for the two types of 
items. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should review this case de novo and ought 
not to give deference to the lower court's conclusions of law 
based on the stipulated record. Because the taxpayer was 
paying for the list broker's services as much as for anything 
else and because the taxpayer was purchasing intangible 
information, this Court should reverse the lower court and hold 
that the transactions at issue were not taxable and that the 
taxpayer is entitled to a full refund. 
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DATED this ,''/' ' day of August, 1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By Rpj-vV, Y ^  "~/V -*'?'"'> J 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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